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STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT THROUGH RELATIONSHIP MANAGEMENT 
 
 
Steve Rowlinson, Martin Tuuli and Tas Koh 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The conditions under which construction projects are undertaken are conducive to 
disputes and hostilities from stakeholders. The challenge for the project team becomes 
one of implementing project strategies such that positive stakeholder’s influence is 
maximized and negative influence is minimized (Walker et al., 2008). Nowhere perhaps 
is this phenomenon more obvious than in Hong Kong where the populace have, over the 
past decade, found their voices following the return of the colony to China in 1997 after 
150 years of British rule and growing agitation for a more democratic society. The 
historical context is therefore important in understanding the current situation regarding 
stakeholder management and relationship management in Hong Kong.  
 
During the colonial years, a British approach to construction was followed, focusing 
strongly on the traditional approach which was regulated and administered by a strong 
civil service. This led to a construction industry which relied heavily on hierarchy, 
tradition and procedures in order to function effectively, but the industry was also 
heavily influenced by the Chinese culture in which it was situated. Hence, values such as 
face, harmony and conflict avoidance were also embedded in the industry culture. In 
such a situation, the issue of stakeholders and their management was paid scant regard; 
the government was used to making decisions on development rather than consulting 
widely and the other major players – the oligarchy of large property developers – 
adopted a simple, economic approach to their business plans. Only over the past few 
years have issues such as corporate social responsibility reached boardrooms. Matters 
are, however, changing and Hong Kong people have become much more challenging of 
their government and institutions and have demanded that they be consulted and 
involved in all developments (e.g. the West Kowloon Cultural Hub, the Tamar Site 
redevelopment and the demolition of the Star Ferry and Queen’s Piers).  
 
In response to this wave of change, major client and construction organizations are 
embracing corporate social responsibility as a business strategy which in many ways is 
seen as a driver of stakeholder engagement and management. ‘Respect for people’ is 
becoming a core theme in construction organizations. Against this background the issue 
of relationship management has become prominent in stakeholder management 
discourse. To place the development of stakeholder management in Hong Kong in 
context, we examine how relationship management can shape stakeholder management 
and present two cases as part of our ongoing research to exemplify such an approach. 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Freeman (1984) contends that it is management’s job to understand stakeholder 
behavior and to engage with them whether or not there is agreement on appropriateness 
of that behavior. Effective management of relationships with stakeholders is therefore an 
important managerial activity (Lim et al., 2005). Relationship management has emerged 
as a sustainable approach for the construction industry in terms of people, environment 
and economics, and has the potential for satisfying client and stakeholder interests. This 
arises in part from the realization that the construction project can no longer be viewed 
as an isolated undertaking to satisfy the objectives of a small group of financing or 
sponsoring organizations, but must be viewed holistically as part of the social, economic 
and political structure within which it exists (Palmer and McGeorge, 1997). Managing the 
soft side of projects, such as the public image of major civil engineering projects, has 
thus proven to be as important as managing their physical creation (Lemley, 1996).  
 
A relationship management approach demands a realization of the broadening of the 
boundary of the project organization where project managers are required to lead 
coalitions and coordinate interests which coincide, while resolving conflicts among 
nonaligned interests. It is essential, therefore, that senior managers do not view the 
large networks of stakeholders as constraints to maximization of the organization’s 
objectives, but must adopt the dominant managerial metaphor of negotiation (Freeman, 
1984). Project procurement and financing arrangements have resulted in a shift from the 
singular client to plural client set-ups. An outcome of the increasing size and complexity 
of projects is that single construction organizations no longer have the capacity, 
resources and technical know-how to successfully implement such projects single-
handedly. Joint ventures have therefore experienced a surge in places such as Hong 
Kong. In an ongoing infrastructure project for example, a combination of the above 
factors has resulted in a project organization set-up comprising over 20 primary 
stakeholder organizations including a plural client (four different departments fully 
involved), main contractor (joint venture of two organizations), consultant (resident site 
staff and the engineer), adjoining project 1 team (plural client—four departments, JV 
main contractor—four organizations and consultant) and adjoining project 2 team (plural 
client—four departments, JV main contractor—four organizations and consultant). These 
scenarios compound the difficulties in stakeholder management, as will be demonstrated 
later in case studies, making the need to employ relationship management principles in 
stakeholder management and engagement an imperative. 
 
Over the past decade there has been an increasing emphasis on the use of relationship 
management in the administration of construction projects worldwide. This emphasis is 
manifest in the proliferation of partnering arrangements, public private partnerships and 
alliances. Such approaches have met with varying degrees of success in different 
jurisdictions and this is in part due to the manner in which they have been implemented 
(see, for example, Cheung et al., 2005; Lau and Rowlinson, 2005; Rowlinson et al., 
2006). Researchers have identified what they believe to be critical success factors for 
successful relationship management. Even so, there has been no consistent evidence on 
the efficacy of these factors. In particular, the influence of culture, be it sentient, 
organizational or national, has emerged as a strong moderating factor in the success of 
relationship management approaches. 
 
Walker et al. (2008) have pointed out that the fundamental principles behind 
relationship management – trust building, commitment and innovation – are the same 
as those necessary for the implementation of successful stakeholder management. They 
illustrate this using an expectancy model and explain how trust is built up in phases and 
how both trust and distrust result in different management styles being used in dealing 
with relationships (Walker et al., 2008: 79-80). The outcome of this process is the 
development of commitment, in this instance throughout the project team including 
stakeholders.  
 
When dealing with the issue of relationship management it is, however, apparent from 
the literature that the choice of contract strategy has a significant impact on the 
effectiveness of the relationship management process (Cheung et al., 2005; Rowlinson 
et al., 2006; Walker and Rowlinson, 2008). Hence, when dealing with stakeholder 
management the same should apply. The case studies discussed below provide examples 
whereby the choice of an appropriate contract strategy facilitates the stakeholder 
management process. Indeed, one of the case studies indicates some serious 
shortcomings in the relationship management process, and similarly stakeholder 
management, because of an attempt to bolt on the partnering approach to a traditional 
design-bid-build contract.  
 
In analyzing the nature of working relationships and management attitudes in an alliance 
project in Australia, Lingard et al. (2007) revealed the positive effects of a full blown 
alliance on various aspects of individual and project performance. By reducing the 
working week to five days the work life balance of employees was improved 
dramatically. As a consequence, a much more open and blame free atmosphere 
developed amongst the participants in the project team than is usual on a construction 
project. This led to a more innovative approach to all aspects of work, enabling the 
project team to embrace the aspirations of all stakeholders in a positive manner. The 
conclusions that can be drawn from such a situation are that an appropriate contract 
strategy melded with a positive relationship management approach enables stakeholder 
management to take place in an atmosphere which is receptive and can find positive 
outcomes from divergent interests. Again, this finding is illustrated in the case studies. 
 
While a relationship management approach as advocated above for stakeholder 
management has clear benefits, emerging empirical evidence in projects shows a range 
of response strategies being employed to engage and manage stakeholders. These 
generally range from proactive strategies consistent with relationship management 
principles to more passive strategies consistent with minimalistic interventions. In a 
recent study of stakeholder response strategies in four global projects, Aaltonen and 
Sivonen (2009) drew on the work of Oliver (1991) on organizational responses to 
institutional pressures to show five response strategies employed by focal organizations 
to manage stakeholders. The strategies include dismissal, avoidance, compromise, 
adaptation and influence. Dismissal strategies ignore stakeholder demands while 
pursuing project goals as defined by the focal organization. Avoidance strategies attempt 
to guard and shield the organization from stakeholder demands while deliberately 
transferring responsibility for responding to such demands to other organizations. A 
compromising strategy relies on negotiation and dialogue to reconcile stakeholder 
demands with project goals and objectives. Under adaptation, the tendency is to yield to 
stakeholder demands leading to adjustment in project objectives and deliverables. 
Influence strategies however shape proactively the demands and values of stakeholders 
by actively sharing information and building relationships with stakeholders. Clearly, a 
relationship management approach to stakeholder management as discussed above 
aligns with the compromise, adaptation and influence strategies. In the following 
discussion of two construction projects, traces of these strategies can be discerned. 
 
 
RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Case study: Project Alpha 
 
The case project is an integral part of a 7.6 km long major highway infrastructure 
undertaking. The works in Project Alpha comprise the construction of a 1.1 km elevated 
viaduct, dual three-lane carriageway (average 65m above ground) to connect a tunnel 
(under construction) on one end and a cable-stayed bridge (under construction) at the 
other end. The project site is reclaimed land (to be handed over in phases), surrounded 
by industrial facilities, container terminals and an educational institution. The contract is 
a re-measurement type with a price fluctuation clause and awarded for an initial contract 
period of 40 months and at an initial contract sum of HK$1,012 million. The project is 
delivered under a traditional design-bid-build approach in which the client engages the 
services of an engineering consultant to design, administer the contract and supervise 
the works undertaken by the contractor. 
  
The particular features of this project, especially its size, location (vertically and 
horizontally) and technical complexity, brought together myriad stakeholders, whose 
interests needed to be aligned at various phases to deliver the project successfully. Five 
incidents, involving critical and contentious issues during the construction phase of the 
project, are used to illustrate how the stakeholders surrounding each incident were 
identified, managed or mismanaged individually and collectively in resolving the various 
issues. The impact of the procurement arrangement on the configuration of project 
stakeholders and the implications for their management are also discussed. 
 
 
Incident analysis 
 
Table 1 summarizes the key features of each incident: the stakeholders, stakeholder 
interests, consequences of not managing the interests, characterization of response 
strategy and manifestation of the response strategies. The nature of the incidents and 
their management are briefly discussed below. 
 
 
Table 1. Stakeholder management initiatives and outcomes in Project Alpha. 
 
<take in Table 1> 
 
 
Change in interface arrangement. The contractor proposed to change the interface 
arrangement regarding the positioning and maneuvering of the launching girder on the 
deck of an adjoining bridge project (under construction) from that proposed in their 
Technical Proposal at the bid stage and which was subsequently built into the contract. 
From an overall project perspective, the new proposal had implications for progress and 
risks, especially the achievement of the project key dates. The contractor however 
considered the change necessary to make the launching operation simpler and safer. The 
stakeholders in this incident, whose input and buy-in was required, are summarized in 
the upper part of Table 1. The critical and contentious issues were: 
 
1. structural stability of the bridge deck; 
2. partial removal of temporary supports to the bridge deck; 
3. achievement of key dates in jeopardy; 
4. responsibility for risk and liability for any unforeseen circumstances; and 
5. associated cost and time liability needing to be established. 
 
While the first two technical issues were easier to resolve with the bridge contractor, the 
last three contractual issues were most problematic due to entrenched positions. 
Attempts to obtain buy-in of all parties included presentations and mock demonstrations, 
meetings and ‘ping-pong’ correspondence to resolve differences. The client required the 
contractors to waive their rights to claim time and associated costs which they declined. 
After six months of negotiations, the contractor was forced to revert to the original 
proposal. Ironically, the segment launching operation itself actually took less than three 
weeks to complete after reverting to the original plan. It is interesting that the spirit of 
the non-contractual partnering that was in place on the project and continuously 
reinforced through various workshops could not help. Indeed, an attempt to use the 
partnering process to resolve this issue was met with silence from all parties, reinforcing 
the skeptics’ belief that many parties who sign-up to such non-contractual partnering 
arrangements have little commitment to working in a true partnership. 
  
While there appear to have been genuine efforts by the contractor (maybe because of 
standing to benefit most if the proposal was approved) to engage and obtain buy-in 
through response strategies, which can be characterized as involving influence, 
compromise and adaptation, it is doubtful whether any alternative mode of engaging, 
(especially the client) could have yielded a different outcome. Public project settings are 
particularly replete with risk averse and fear of blame attitudes. This, rather than the 
means of engagement of the parties, may be why a proposal such as this was 
predisposed to failure. 
 
 
Temporary Traffic Arrangement (TTA). To facilitate the works and safeguard the 
public, it was necessary during the project to temporarily divert traffic passing through 
the site. These changes to the normal movement of traffic are handled under a 
Temporary Traffic Arrangement (TTA). The key players and issues are shown in the 
middle of Table 1. The key stakeholder in the TTAs was the Traffic Management Liaison 
Group (TMLG), whose decision supersedes the contract provisions regarding the TTAs. 
The key players in the TMLG were the police and Transport Department, with the other 
members tending to go with whatever these two decided.  
 
The client’s audit team continually issued ‘non-compliances’ (NCs) for various breaches 
and the client’s project team called on the Engineer’s Representative (ER) to step up 
inspections to forestall any future breaches. The ER together with the contractor then 
instituted various measures to prevent contraventions of the TTA arrangements in the 
form of three daily joint-inspections – in the morning, afternoon and early evening. This 
was augmented with management of public expectations. Several initiatives were also in 
place in this regard: 
  
 advance notice to client and concerned members of the public on TTAs; 
 feedback from the public on TTA implementation; and 
 ‘complaint walk’ where the client goes on site to walk through, with the ER and 
contractor, mitigation measures in response to complaints from the public.  
 
These measures were successful in reducing the NCs to zero for the following months. 
TTAs are an important feature in roadwork projects and are considered one of the most 
challenging tasks on most road projects (Chan, 2003). Indeed, the project team, 
especially the contractor, is keen on ensuring that inconvenience to the public is reduced 
as much as possible by engaging all stakeholders for successful implementation of all 
TTAs. 
 
 Community planting exercise. Under a directive on ‘community involvement in 
greening works’, all capital works contracts with the estimated value of the landscape 
works in excess of HK$3 million should involve consultations with the respective district 
councils in regard to greening works prior to bid. It is a condition that the community be 
invited to participate in the planting works near to or after the completion of the project. 
Since the value of the landscape works on the project was less than HK$3 million, the 
adjoining bridge project (whose value for landscape was also less than HK$3million) was 
invited to join the community planting exercise. Thus, both the contractor and consultant 
confirmed that the community planting exercise was not part of the original contract, but 
a public relations exercise by the client. Nonetheless, the ER was quite supportive. 
 
The key participants for the community planting project were pupils from two selected 
primary schools in the neighborhood and some district council members. The contractor 
had some concerns, however, about the composition of the volunteers for the planting 
exercise and expressed reservations: 
 
“... there is some hidden risk in this, because for us at the moment, this is still a 
construction site; so under the law anybody who comes into the site will require a 
green card. If he is a worker, he needs to have a registration card [...] the kids 
who will be doing the planting, they are actually doing [the contractor’s] work. 
Technically they are doing our permanent works because they are planting the 
area where [the contractor] is supposed to plant, so they don’t have green cards, 
they don’t have workers’ registration cards and they are all under age.” 
Contractor’s representative. 
 
Taken together however, the community planting exercise appears to be well received 
by the volunteers and attracting public enthusiasm. This can be attributed to the fact 
that it presents them with the opportunity to get closer to projects than they normally 
would, and in the process learn more about how taxpayers’ money is being spent. 
Government and community representatives are also keen to show up at such exercises 
as it gives them the opportunity to engage closely and interact with their constituents. 
 
 
Construction noise permit (CNP). Following a proposal to change from the use of two 
launching girders to one launching girder and a crawler crane, the contractor further 
proposed a 24-hour cycle for the erection of the viaduct segments in order to achieve an 
equivalent productivity level. The continuous supply of precast segments to the 
launching girder beyond 11pm in order to ensure that a 24-hour working cycle was 
achieved proved problematic, because the proposed storage area for the precast 
segments was directly beneath a student hall of residence and the carrier that supplied 
the segments to this area generated noise above the acceptable Environmental 
Protection Department’s (EPD) limits. The key players and their interests are shown in 
the middle of Table 1. 
 
To mitigate the situation, several measures exemplary of influence, compromise and 
adaptation were employed: 
 
 modifications to the segment carrier using a noise enclosure; 
 trial with measured noise levels recorded and presented to the EPD;  
 closure of windows in the hall facing the site at all times; and  
 replacement of old air-conditioners with much quieter new units. 
 
The client played a key role in facilitating the approval process as testified by the 
contractor: 
 
“... [the client] was involved in some of the discussions, so everyone was 
involved trying to satisfy EPD, even [the client] went with [the contractor] to 
discuss with EPD, about what could be done, what is acceptable to [EPD] in terms 
of noise level from the point of view of EPD for it to issue a permit” Contractor’s 
representative. 
 
 
Miscast segments. An estimated 67 precast viaduct segments were miscast by the 
precast subcontractor due to wrong setting-out information and resulted in the 
incorporation of cross-falls in the wrong direction. In view of the significant and 
unrecoverable delay to the work that this error could cause, there was the urgent need 
to review the procedures relating to the production of the precast segments in the yard 
in mainland China by strengthening supervision – see bottom of Table 1 for key players 
and interests in this incident. 
 
Since some of the miscast segments were already erected, the key issues were to 
mitigate delays and consequences of the errors in the segments already erected in terms 
of the alignment of the finished road surface. Given the implications of lost production 
time on progress of the works, the contractor further proposed incorporating as many of 
the miscast segments as possible into the works since the errors had no implications for 
the structural capacity of the viaduct. In line with this proposal, a full report on the 
segment errors was prepared and submitted to the ER so that the feasibility of further 
incorporating as many of the miscast segments (without rectification) into the works 
could be evaluated.  
 
There was close collaboration among all parties to resolve this issue as soon as possible 
and the client’s role was especially crucial. It is clear that the consequence of the miscast 
error for all stakeholders was an incentive to work together for a fruitful resolution of the 
problem. This demonstrates the power of joint interest or joint risk in motivating 
stakeholders to work for the common good of the project. Yet, the inability to agree on 
how to dispose of the remaining precast segments showed how lack of alignment of 
interests forestalls consensus building. 
 
 
Impact of procurement arrangement 
 
As noted earlier, the project was procured under a traditional design-bid-build approach. 
It is apparent from the discussion so far that the arms-length mindset associated with 
this approach contributed to how some of the incidents played out. It is commendable, 
however, that interface arrangements were built into the contract. This approach clearly 
defined the interdependence between the two projects from the onset as an issue to be 
managed during the project. Nonetheless, the interface arrangement appears to have 
been structured without consideration for the uncertainties that can arise in a project of 
this size and complexity. The situation was further exacerbated by the inflexibility of the 
various parties. Ironically, there was a non-contractual partnering arrangement in place, 
in which the parties promised to work in partnership. Yet, when it mattered most all the 
stakeholders held on to their contractual rights.  
 
The structuring of the project organization also had implications for a number of 
stakeholders on any issue and thus their management. First, the client organization was 
pluralistic. On many issues three or more different departments of the client organization 
needed to be satisfied and this became even more problematic when they disagreed. The 
fact that the contractors on the two adjoining projects were joint ventures also had 
implications for engaging them. In this case, the board of directors of the JVs appeared 
to have played only a passive role, as most of issues were considered site matters, 
which were within the domain of the site teams. Some contractual provisions also had 
implications for the number of stakeholders who needed to be engaged; for example, the 
Engineer’s Representative as a separate entity from the Engineer and the use of an 
Independent Checking Engineer (ICE), whose role was to check all contractor designs 
and the TMLG. 
 
 
Stakeholder management outcomes 
 
Five incidents have been analyzed above to show how stakeholder management on an 
infrastructure project manifested (see Table 1 for full summary). In the management of 
both internal and external stakeholders, it was clear that when the stake for all 
stakeholders on the issue of contention was high there was a tendency to reach an 
agreement easily. Culture specific dynamics also manifested in the positions that 
different stakeholders took on issues and there was a general tendency for ‘rule 
following’ or adherence strictly to the contract. This may be attributable to the fear of 
blame culture pervasive in public project settings and the conflict avoiding view inherent 
in the Confucian value system. 
 
Notwithstanding the good intentions of proponents, the incidents also indicate that it 
might sometimes be impossible to gain buy-in from stakeholders no matter how hard 
parties try to engage. Buy-in appears particularly difficult when the issues are 
contractual in nature. The need for stakeholder management is also driven in some 
cases by government policy or contractual arrangements (e.g. TTAs, interface 
arrangement and community planting). While this may give parties the opportunity to 
strategize and implement more structured approaches to managing stakeholders, the 
incidents show that ad hoc approaches are dominant. Unlike the projects analyzed by 
Aaltonen and Sivonen (2009) however, the response strategies employed by the focal 
organizations were proactive, reflective of a desire to invoke relationship management 
strategies in managing stakeholders. 
 
Taken together, this case study demonstrates an element of progress towards public 
engagement on projects in Hong Kong, an element that was unheard of a decade ago. 
Yet, the arms-length mindset, perpetuated by decades of use of the traditional 
procurement approach is still prevalent. Indeed, when collaborative initiatives such as 
partnering are bolted on to the traditional procurement system there is little evidence of 
real partnership. Thus, a shift in culture, both in terms of the way stakeholders are 
engaged and projects procured, appears a viable option for project delivery in Hong 
Kong. 
 
 
Case study: Project Beta 
 
The project is being implemented at a time when there is increasing emphasis by the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) government on sustainability and 
community development in public housing through the procurement and implementation 
of project processes. Four sustainability dimensions have been adopted by the 
government with a focus on balancing the economic, environmental and social concerns 
of all the stakeholders in the project. To achieve these goals, various initiatives are 
increasingly being embedded in the bidding and contracting procedures in the 
implementation of projects. 
 
Project Beta is Phase 4 (of six phases) of public-rental housing involving the construction 
of three 41-storey blocks, estimated to provide a total of about 2,369 units of rental 
apartments. The value of the works is estimated at about HK$434 million and is 
contracted out for an initial period of 36 months. The works are procured broadly under 
a traditional design-bid-build approach using the Government of Hong Kong General 
Conditions of Contract for Building Works (1993 Edition). Special conditions of contract 
are incorporated to cater for six work packages contracted under a Modified Guaranteed 
Maximum Price (MGMP) arrangement which collectively make-up about 31% of the 
contract sum.  
  
 
Stakeholder management 
 
Several initiatives were implemented to engage stakeholders both internal and external 
to the project organization. Table 2 provides a general summary of the key issues, the 
stakeholders, stakeholder interests, consequences of not managing their interests, 
characterization of response strategy and manifestation of the response strategies. The 
first initiative targeted at internal stakeholders is the ‘workers wage protection scheme’. 
The scheme is a direct response to workers’ concerns on the protection of their wages in 
the event of default by the contractor or subcontractor. This scheme had several 
elements: 
 
 on-demand bond in the contract which can be used to secure payment of wages 
for affected workers;  
 a labor relations officer (LRO) employed on site to check, verify and monitor 
workers’ wage records. The LRO also receives, acknowledges and records 
complaints and follows up complaints on site;  
 subcontractors are required to pay their workers on time before applying to the 
main contractor for their monthly payment in conjunction with works done; and 
 computerized wage monitoring system equipped with a sophisticated mechanism 
to track wage payment such that if late payment to the workers is encountered, 
the system issues a warning and the subcontractor’s payment is delayed.  
 
The main contractor of the project has also adopted other primary stakeholder 
management initiatives concerning mainly the on-site welfare provision for workers and 
staff, and human resource development for the site management team. The initiatives 
include: 
 
 health promotion program that includes basic health check and health counseling 
for workers with health conditions (e.g. hypertension); cash prizes for high 
performing workers; heat stress preventive program in view of the high 
temperature summer working periods; the provision of mobile mist generating 
machines; installation of thermometers throughout the site; the provision of 
workers’ quarters and laundry areas;  
 team members are encouraged and sent to attend various personal development 
courses that include management skills, technical skills and leadership. 
 promotion of a familial atmosphere among the site team, e.g. coaching program, 
recognition and the active seeking and provision of opportunities for site staff to 
try new things within their capability.  
 systematic recognition and promotion scheme (both financial and positional 
rewards). The results observed were the promotion of some site staff and the re-
joining of some junior engineers after the completion of their industrial training 
with the main contractor.  
 
The emerging outcomes of these initiatives are in line with studies conducted elsewhere 
that indicate the clan type culture which emphasizes that people orientation is more 
conducive to successful project outcomes, albeit in the area of quality management 
(Thomas et al., 2002). The management of secondary stakeholders, in particular, on the 
part of the client has seen a saliency in the client’s pro-activeness in engaging 
stakeholders. The client has built into planning and development processes a number of 
community engagement initiatives: 
 
 a series of activities designed to instill a greater sense of belonging and 
participation of the community in the project, e.g. a competition for mural 
painting was organized in the community with the winning design being 
incorporated as a permanent mural feature for the estate; 
 ‘Action Seedling’ to promote community participation in the project. Local 
residents and school children from nearby schools participated in planting 
seedlings and nursing the plants for the estate under construction; and  
 extensive use of prefabricated building elements and hard paved site areas to 
reduce dust and noise. 
 
In response to the client’s push for active community engagement from the beginning, 
the notion of corporate social responsibility (CSR) gradually evolved throughout the main 
contractor’s organization. As a result of increased awareness on the impact of its 
activities on the community, the contractor has been active in participating and 
responding to the client’s drive for community engagement, at times going beyond the 
requirements of the client. Two incidents exemplify the contractor’s active involvement 
in volunteer activities. 
  
1. House improvement work during a festival to help elderly residents at the nearby 
estate, by dispatching two teams of personnel to help repair malfunctioning 
services within the apartments.  
2. Construction related information provided to nearby residents in connection with 
prolonging construction activities beyond normal working hours. 
  
 
 
Table 2. Stakeholder management initiatives and outcomes in Project Beta. 
 
<take in Table 2> 
 
 
 Stakeholder management outcomes 
 
Several implications can be drawn from the foregoing project stakeholder management 
initiatives in this project. As in Project Alpha above, the stakeholder management 
responses in Project Beta tended to embrace a relationship management perspective. 
Even so, not every level within the organization exhibited this proactive attitude as 
elements of dismissal and avoidance surfaced at the lower levels as exemplified by some 
of the outcomes discussed below. 
 
 
Passive reaction. There was passive reaction among the subcontractors and junior 
staff members to the initiation and implementation of stakeholder management. The 
situation was particularly evident in the management of secondary stakeholders. It 
appeared that the members of the lower echelon were adopting a minimalist approach. 
For these members, engaging with external stakeholder was not seen as contributing 
directly to their immediate work.  
 
 
Lack of a structured approach to project stakeholder management. The 
preceding observation is symptomatic of the lack of a structured project stakeholder 
management system on the part of the main contractor. The deficiency is particularly 
acute with external stakeholder management. Despite considerable success in dealing 
with and tackling issues within the community, the main contractor admitted that the 
approach was one of trial and error. There was no deliberate or structured approach to 
identify external stakeholders, their impacts and the method of engaging them. While 
the efforts and achievement of the main contractor have to be commended, the situation 
reflects the somewhat parochial mentality of the construction fraternity in terms of 
external stakeholder management. 
 Contracting firms have traditionally adopted the attitude that construction operations are 
confined within the boundary of the site. Site operations are therefore a closed system. 
This view overlooks both the direct (e.g. dust and noise) and indirect impact (e.g. bad 
impression resultant from direct impact) on the community. In terms of engaging 
external stakeholders and mitigating the impacts construction activities cause, it is not in 
the interest of firms to do more than necessary as costs are incurred in extra efforts. 
Hence, shareholder management and interest still overrides the stakeholder paradigm. 
That is, the stakeholders’ perspectives are not integrated into the project formulation 
processes despite the best intentions of both parties (c.f. Cleland and Ireland, 2007).  
 
 
No allowance for additional resources for stakeholder management. Despite the 
various external stakeholder management activities that had been carried out by the 
main contractor, there was no provision of additional resources for the main contractor 
under the contract. The reward from the client comes in the form of recognition. In 
addition, given its status as a pilot project the ensuing image issues and the high stakes 
involved especially for the two primary stakeholders of the client and main contractor, 
the main contractor resorted to adsorbing the extra costs (Mahesh et al., 2007). Yet, 
while the costs involved in carrying out those activities are not considered large, the lack 
of compensation from the client may lead to token efforts from the main contractor.  
 
 
Engagement of specialist subcontractors from the client’s nominated list. The 
subcontractors for two GMP packages were ‘novated’ from the client’s nominated list, but 
because of the nature and element of design and build inherent in the packages, these 
subcontractors were engaged as domestic subcontractors. The arrangement is seen as a 
move to improve buildability, thereby achieving a cost saving design. Although the 
arrangement helps ensure quality control to some extent for the client, it can reduce the 
main contractor’s capacity to stay within the GMP (Haley and Shaw, 2002). In addition, 
the level of cooperation between these novated subcontractors and the main contractor 
needs extra attention and promotion. For this project, it was observed that the client’s 
intervention was invoked in the initial stage of the project to bring the parties together. 
In the long run, however, a more appropriate arrangement needs to be implemented.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
It is apparent from the case studies above that tradition, custom and practice, politics 
and culture have a major influence on how stakeholder management is undertaken in 
the Hong Kong construction industry. Without a strong tradition of democracy it is not 
surprising that the move to draw the public, green groups and other parties into the 
development process has moved forward slowly; there is no evidence of resistance to 
change, rather an inertia grounded in the traditional values of society and the structure 
of government departments and institutions which puts a brake on change. This is not 
totally surprising: if one studies the position of Hong Kong on Hofstede’s dimensions of 
culture it is obvious that nations such as the UK and USA have a value infrastructure 
which is more open to stakeholder involvement and empowerment (see Figure 1). The 
Confucian values of harmony and conflict avoidance are often an opposing force to the 
drive for stakeholder empowerment. 
 
 
<take in Fig. 1> 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of scores for Hong Kong, USA and UK on Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions. 
 
 
There is evidence from the case studies that change is taking place and that the post-
colonial administration is becoming more attuned to the legitimate demands of its 
stakeholders and a re-education process is taking place. It is apparent from the cases 
discussed above that focal organizations are shedding their dismissal and avoidance 
response strategies of the past and embracing proactive responses of adaptation, 
compromise and influence to manage stakeholders. This cannot be described as a 
cultural revolution, but a culture change is taking place. A move away from traditional 
procurement forms is now underway within the Hong Kong Housing Authority leading the 
way and the other Works Bureau departments commencing a range of experiments with 
more open procurement forms. Indeed, the incorporation of partnering type agreements 
into many projects has contributed to a change in culture and led to more open attitude 
to cooperation and collaboration in construction projects (Anvuur, 2008). In line with this 
development there needs to be a recognition that performance measures have to be 
refocused to take into account medium and long term objectives in line with the 
arguments put forward by Walker et al. (2008). As Table 3 shows the stakeholder 
management strategies in both cases were driven by five main issues: procurement 
systems reform, improved collaboration, lifecycle value consideration, community 
involvement and community benefits. 
 
In recent years, employees and stakeholders have also become much more aware of the 
need for firms and government to show a commitment to corporate social responsibility 
(Rowlinson, 2008) and this has raised awareness in all sectors. Indeed, major 
infrastructure and property developers have taken on board stakeholder management as 
part of their corporate social responsibility commitment; time will tell whether this is a 
marketing fad or a genuine culture change in the industry. With the establishment of the 
Construction Industry Council in 2008 there is now an industry wide body dedicated to 
improving performance in the real estate and construction industries. One of its first 
tasks has been to improve construction site safety and this has involved an attempt to 
engage workers, managers and directors in a framework that provides a basis for joint 
problem solving and initiative development. Such approaches augur well for the future 
development of stakeholder management and empowerment. 
 
 
<take in Table 3> 
 
Table 3. Comparative analysis of stakeholder management issues and strategies across 
cases. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
For further progress to be made in stakeholder management the Hong Kong real estate 
and construction industry needs to build on the current modest achievements as 
exemplified in the two cases above. This will require that the industry addresses several 
knotty issues that continue to inhibit progress in effective stakeholder engagement and 
relationship management. A good starting point is procurement reform. There is the 
need to allow for more innovative and collaborative approaches to the project 
development process. The recent uproar on harbor reclamation issues is a reminder that 
such an approach is long overdue. This should then be extended across all the phases of 
the project process so that a culture change can begin to take place throughout the 
industry where participants focus on cooperation and collaboration rather than defensive 
reactions.  
 
As the two cases show, a focus on the real meaning of value in the project context 
rather than a decision making process based on lowest initial costs is a much more 
promising path for the industry. Such an approach will reinforce the cooperative and 
collaborative agenda, allowing a focus on what is best for the project. At the front-end of 
project implementation then, a commitment to community involvement and a full 
implementation of the principles of corporate social responsibility in both public and 
private sectors will be required. This will also mean that organizations empower the 
teams and individuals they deploy at the project level and who interact at the 
organization interfaces so they can effectively engage each other and the external 
stakeholders of the projects.  
 
Table 1 Stakeholder Management Initiatives and Outcomes in Project Alpha 
Stakeholder Stakeholder 
Interests 
Consequences of 
not managing 
interests 
Response 
Strategy 
Manifestations 
 Interface Arrangement 
Viaduct Contractor Safer work 
environment; 
simpler site 
operations 
Escalation of risks, 
non-achievement of 
key dates 
Influence, 
Compromise, 
Adaptation 
Buy-in of key 
stakeholders; 
formal and 
informal 
engagement; 
interface 
meetings; ping-
pong letters; 
presentations; 
mock 
demonstrations 
Bridge Contractor Structural stability 
of bridge 
Risk and liability 
Client Limit liability and 
claims; Structural 
stability of bridge 
Blame/reprimand 
from superiors;  
Escalation of risk 
Engineer’s 
Representatives 
(viaduct & bridge) 
Projecting client’s 
interests; 
enforcement of 
contract 
Loss of client’s trust 
The Engineers 
(viaduct & bridge) 
Projecting client’s 
interests; 
enforcement of 
contract 
Loss of client’s trust 
ICE Neutral Neutral 
assessment 
Project Board of 
Directors (viaduct 
& bridge) 
Safer and simpler 
site operations 
Passive observer 
     
 Temporary Traffic Arrangement (TTA) 
Viaduct Contractor Non-compliance, 
least 
inconvenience to 
road users 
Inconvenience to 
road users; Loss of 
reputation of key 
project participants; 
public complaints 
Influence, 
Compromise, 
Adaptation 
Management of 
public 
expectations; 3-
cycle daily joint 
inspections; 
feedback from 
road users; 
complaint walk; 
Government’s 
central complaints 
unit (1823 
Citizens Easy 
Link (CEL)) 
Road users 
(general public) 
least 
inconvenience  
Client Reduction in non-
compliance, least 
inconvenience to 
road users 
Client’s Audit 
Team 
Enforcement of 
TTA 
Engineer’s 
Representatives 
Reduction in non-
compliance, least 
inconvenience to 
road users 
TMLG Faster resolution 
of TTA issues,  
     
 Community Planting Exercise 
Client Community 
involvement; PR, 
promotion sense 
of ownership, 
public enthusiasm 
Public agitation; 
Negative publicity 
Influence, 
Compromise, 
Adaptation 
Invitation to 
participate; 
community out-
reach; onsite 
community 
Contractors Liability and 
safety issues; 
insurance; 
composition of 
volunteers 
Lack of 
commitment 
planting 
Engineer’s 
Representative 
Projecting client’s 
interests; 
enforcement of 
contract 
Loss of client’s trust 
Public (school 
Children) 
Participation  
     
 Construction Noise Permit (CNP) 
Contractor 24-hour cycle; 
constant supply of 
segments; storage 
area 
Delays to works Influence, 
Compromise, 
Adaptation 
Mitigation 
measures; 
meetings; 
Government’s 
central complaints 
unit (1823 
Citizens Easy 
Link (CEL)) 
Client Noise level; public 
complaints 
Delays to works; 
public complaints 
School (Hall of 
residence) 
Noise level Inconvenience; 
public complaints 
EPD Enforcement of 
noise regulation 
 
     
 Miscast segments 
Contractor (pre-
cast subcontractor) 
Significant and 
unrecoverable 
delay and loss of 
resources;  
Delays to works; 
Waste of resources 
Influence, 
Compromise, 
Adaptation 
Review of pre-
cast procedures; 
strengthening 
supervision; 
mitigation 
measures 
Client Dept/Units 
(Maintenance & 
Audit) 
Build as designed, 
easy maintenance 
Maintenance 
difficulties 
 
Engineer’s 
Representation/The 
Engineer 
enforcement of 
contract 
Damaged reputation Ping-pong letters 
ICE Neutral 
assessment 
Neutral  
 
 
